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 Though many people believe that Ralph Waldo Emerson was a brilliant thinker, lecturer, 
and writer, there is a widespread notion among scholars that he abandoned his early philosophy 
during the latter stages of his life, casting a negative light on his legacy. Gertrude Reif Hughes 
summarizes this prevalent view as follows: “A commonplace of Emerson scholarship holds that 
the early voice of rhapsodic affirmation and challenge gave way, after the death of little Waldo 
in 1842 or the Mexican war of 1846, to a voice that is more skeptical, or resigned, or just plain 
tired” (ix). This belief that Emerson’s later work lacks his youth’s forcefulness serves as the 
impetus for this thesis, and I spend the bulk of the ensuing chapters evaluating the more specific 
argument among these critics that the older Emerson renounced the idealistic tenets of his early 
thought because of their impracticability.  
 It is impossible to assess this consensus if I treat Emerson’s early philosophy as merely 
transcendental, a label that most scholars use to characterize his work. To avoid this problem, I 
approach my critique of Stephen E. Whicher and other scholars’ denunciations of Emerson’s 
later thought by focusing on one vital element of Emerson’s early philosophy: self-reliance. It is 
an idea that has received a lot attention in both mainstream and academic circles, and, more 
importantly, it is “the best single key to [Emerson’s] thought and influence” (Buell 59). In its 
most simple terms, self-reliance is an individual’s ability to think his or her own thoughts. An 
investigation of this idea’s presence, or lack thereof, in Emerson’s later work provides us with a 
means to evaluate the scholarly consensus’s assertion that Emerson deserts his early philosophy 
in the concluding phase of his life.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, Emerson’s later philosophy is defined by the views that he 
sets forth in Society and Solitude, his last major work. By comparing Society and Solitude to 
Emerson’s early philosophy, I am able to ascertain the consistency of Emerson’s portrayal of 
self-reliance over the course of his life. However, before examining whether or not self-reliance 
pervades Society and Solitude, I define the term in the first chapter of my thesis. Essentially, I 
combine George Kateb’s conception of self-reliance, which asserts that it is a form of democratic 
individuality, with Randy L. Friedman’s and Whicher’s claims that the idea involves an inner 
religiousness. After defining self-reliance, the remainder of my thesis works closely with the 
essays in Society and Solitude and utilizes comparisons between these texts and Emerson’s early 
works in order to illustrate self-reliance’s presence in the book.   
 In the second chapter, I focus on self-reliance’s permeation of the most concrete essays in 
Society and Solitude. Throughout this chapter, I demonstrate that these essays’ practical topics 
do not signal a desertion of self-reliance and instead show that self-reliance is a practicable idea. 
Subsequently, the third chapter explores Emerson’s infusion of self-reliance into Society and 
Solitude through abstractions and establishes that Emerson never renounced his “idealistic 
rhetoric” (Rowe 24).  Finally, the conclusion contends that Emerson’s unwavering belief in self-
reliance represents a commitment to idealism that counters George Fredrickson’s theory about 
the Civil War’s dimming effect on American thinkers and Emerson in particular. Overall, this 
examination of self-reliance’s presence in Society and Solitude reveals that Emerson’s later work 
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 How do we judge a writer’s career? Different answers to this question guide our varying 
perceptions of authors, particularly for those who have produced controversial work. Ralph 
Waldo Emerson certainly qualifies as one such divisive writer. For many people, Emerson’s 
legacy is tied to his powerful declarations about nonconformity in “Self-Reliance” (1841). At 
one point in this famous essay, he affirms, “Insist on yourself; never imitate. Your own gift you 
can present every moment with the cumulative force of a whole life’s cultivation; but of the 
adopted talent of another you have only an extemporaneous half possession” (S-R 35).  
Emerson’s supporters appreciate his espousal of independence and admire the writer’s own 
“gift,” which was his dogged attempt to think originally about all facets of life. Essentially, 
Emerson perpetually sought to “speak the truth that emerge[d] from within” (Sacks 4). Through 
this individuality, Emerson was able to draw profound conclusions from the ordinary, or, in his 
own words, “to see the miraculous in the common” (Nature 70). This sentiment played a critical 
role in all of his major works of writing: Nature (1836), Essays (1841), Essays: Second Series 
(1844), Representative Men (1850), English Traits (1856), The Conduct of Life (1860), and 
Society and Solitude (1870). Throughout these books, Emerson’s devotion to his own ideas earns 
him the respect of readers across many generations. 
 Conversely, many individuals do not think that Emerson’s career should be viewed in 
such a positive light. Despite Emerson supporters’ emphasis on the transcendent and enduring 
quality of his work, there is also a widespread notion among critics that Emerson abandoned his 
early philosophy during the latter stages of his life. Gertrude Reif Hughes summarizes this 
prevalent stance as follows: “A commonplace of Emerson scholarship holds that the early voice 




Mexican war of 1846, to a voice that is more skeptical, or resigned, or just plain tired” (ix). 
Stephen E. Whicher, a ring leader of sorts for this strand of thought, calls this Emerson’s 
“acquiescence” to fate (124); similarly, Harold Bloom contends that Emerson’s early “joy” 
succumbed to “later, darker broodings” (55; 61). The death of Emerson’s son, Waldo, is an event 
that many scholars pinpoint as a turning point in Emerson’s work. It followed the publication of 
Essays and preceded the printing of Essays: Second Series. This tragic moment in Emerson’s life 
forced him to confront the “problem of evil,” a challenge to his philosophy that many scholars 
feel he naively addresses in “Compensation” from Essays (Whicher 36). Even prior to this 
incident, Whicher claims that Emerson’s “transcendentalism” was “steadily giving way to a 
basic empiricism—one which, though it includes and stresses man’s peculiar experience of the 
Soul, nevertheless pragmatically recognizes the priority of experience over ‘Reality’” (97). This 
quotation exemplifies Whicher’s influential view of Emerson’s career; he is the forerunner for a 
group of scholars who believe that the transcendental attitude in Nature and Emerson’s other 
early works ultimately yields to a more practical position in his later writings.   
 This scholarly consensus serves as the impetus for this thesis, and the bulk of the 
subsequent chapters are spent evaluating this argument. In one crucial way, this is an impossible 
endeavor. To this point, I have spoken generally about Emerson’s philosophy and scholars’ 
interpretations of it as if there is a viable method for assessing all of his thoughts. Emerson’s 
ideas do fall under an umbrella of sorts; Emerson is known as a founding figure of 
transcendentalism, a school of philosophical thought that emphasized the power of nature and 
individuality. However, there is not a clear line between what is considered transcendental and 
what is not. Consequently, it is impossible to evaluate the scholarly consensus if I treat 




 To avoid this problem, I approach my critique of Whicher and other scholars’ 
denunciations of Emerson’s later thought by focusing on one vital element of Emerson’s early 
philosophy: self-reliance. It is an idea that has received a lot attention in both mainstream and 
academic circles, and, more importantly, it is “the best single key to [Emerson’s] thought and 
influence” (Buell 59). In its most simple terms, self-reliance is an individual’s ability to think his 
or her own thoughts. Emerson expresses this notion when he declares in “Self-Reliance,” 
“Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind” (S-R 21). An investigation of this 
idea’s presence, or lack thereof, in Emerson’s later work provides us with a means to evaluate 
the scholarly consensus’s assertion that Emerson deserted his early philosophy in the concluding 
phase of his life. 
 Up until now, I have referred to Emerson’s “early philosophy” without explicitly defining 
this term. By Emerson’s “early philosophy,” I mean the views that he promotes in Nature, The 
American Scholar (1837), the Divinity School Address (1838), Essays, and Essays: Second 
Series. While many scholars regard Waldo’s death as the crossroads in Emerson’s thought and, 
as a result, include Essays: Second Series as part of his later philosophy, this book was published 
in such close succession to Essays that it seems imprudent to exclude it from his early work. A 
more apt event to divide Emerson’s early thought from his later writing was his second journey 
to England and France in 1847. The trip allowed him to reflect on recent events in his life, and he 
knew that “Europe would challenge him, would displace his central man and make him feel 
peripheral, provincial, and derivative” (Richardson, Jr. 446). After his exposure to the 
revolutions that emerged throughout Europe in 1848, Emerson was pushed to continue his 




 For the purposes of this thesis, the ideas that Emerson sets forth in Society and Solitude, 
his last major work, represent his later philosophy. Although Letters and Social Aims was 
published five years after Society and Solitude in 1875, Emerson’s health significantly 
deteriorated in the months and years preceding the publication of Letters and Social Aims, 
raising doubts about Emerson’s intentions for the book. His nearly nonexistent memory was 
particularly damaging to Letters and Social Aims; on a trip to England in 1872, Emerson could 
not remember the name of his wife at a dinner (Richardson, Jr. 569). This was not an isolated 
occurrence and typified his weakening physical state. More specifically, “he suffered 
from...aphasia; unable to call up a given word, he would resort to circumlocutions that 
sometimes came out like riddles” (569). Therefore, Society and Solitude, a work comprised of 
essays that Emerson refined throughout the 1860s, serves as the final book that we can analyze 
with an expectation that Emerson coherently pieced it together. 
 Society and Solitude contains 12 essays that touch on a wide variety of topics, including 
“Courage,” “Eloquence,” “Books,” “Farming,” and “Success.” Yet, despite its lucid and 
compelling prose, the book is seldom addressed in scholarly circles. On the rare occasion when 
scholars mention Society and Solitude, they either quickly dismiss the book as a manifestation of 
Emerson’s diminishing mental and physical strength or use the work to support the notion that 
Emerson abandoned self-reliance because of its impracticability. The former approach merely 
demonstrates these scholars’ ignorance and thus says little about the book’s content, but the latter 
approach undermines Emerson’s early and late work by insinuating that he has not remained true 
to his philosophy. The impression that Emerson discarded his early thought suggests that he fell 
victim to the “foolish consistency” that he calls the “hobgoblin of little minds” in “Self-




self-reliance throughout the late 1830s and early 1840s, the scholarly consensus that Emerson 
ditched self-reliance in his later years implies that he recognized the “foolish[ness]” and 
impracticability of his idea. This perception of the contrast between Emerson’s early and late 
philosophy shines a negative light on his entire career because it leads people to view Emerson’s 
early writing as naive and his later work as submissive. 
 By comparing Society and Solitude to Emerson’s early philosophy, this thesis is able to 
evaluate the consistency of Emerson’s portrayal of self-reliance over the course of his life. To 
accomplish this contrast, I borrow a method that Hughes employs to illustrate connections 
between Emerson’s early work and The Conduct of Life, his second-to-last major work. Her 
technique is based on the relationship between affirmation and confirmation. She explains, 
“Confirmation not only validates existing thought or belief, it also constitutes a revelation of 
what the original thought or belief entailed” (xi). Basically, the repetition of an idea can shed 
further light on its origins. Relating this concept to Emerson’s texts, parallels between Society 
and Solitude and his early work’s description of self-reliance can show consistency in his 
thought and provide us with a more nuanced understanding of self-reliance. 
 At this point, it is important to acknowledge that, with the exception of The American 
Scholar and the Divinity School Address, my thesis’s scope is limited to Emerson’s major 
philosophical writings. Emerson was a prolific lecturer, kept an impressively detailed journal, 
and dabbled in poetry, but none of these mediums conveyed his philosophy with the same clarity 
as his books of essays. Though much of the material that is found in these works stems from 
Emerson’s lectures, “[r]arely were lectures turned into essays without much revision” (Buell 28). 
Essentially, Emerson’s essays are a more polished form of his thinking and therefore more 




examination because Emerson spent a significant amount of time preparing these lectures for 
momentous occasions, so they also achieve the developed quality that characterizes his essays. 
Moreover, they speak directly to the idea of self-reliance. 
 My exclusion of Emerson’s journals is motivated by a larger issue that I have found in 
my study of self-reliance. Emerson’s notion of a self-reliant individual is clearly an idealistic 
construct. As Lawrence Buell states, “Self-Reliance was not a plateau on which Emerson 
supposed anyone could securely live. It was a goal, a model, a call—to himself as well as others” 
(78-79). Despite Emerson’s depiction of self-reliance as an ideal to be striven for and not 
necessarily attained, many scholars conflate Emerson’s espousal of self-reliance with his own 
attempt to be self-reliant. Kenneth Sacks makes this error when he asserts that Emerson thought 
of himself as a “self-reliant scholar” (48). Sacks considers Emerson’s own failure to live up to 
his ideal—Emerson was constantly “beset with anxiety and self-doubt” (3)—to be an indication 
that Emerson realized self-reliance’s incompatibility with life in society, but Sacks’ deduction 
relies on Emerson’s life experiences, which do not necessarily dictate his writing and 
philosophy. In other words, it is possible for a person to possess a belief and simultaneously be 
unable to practice it. Similarly, scholars have pored through Emerson’s journals and have often 
treated his entries as inspirations for his lectures and essays, but this is a dangerous tactic 
because it puts a scholar in the position of a psychologist. It is impossible to truly ascertain the 
impact of Emerson’s life events on his writing. Emerson’s journal entries are similar to his 
lectures because they lack the refined quality of his essays and, consequently, are inadequate 
sources of his philosophy. 
 Another pitfall that I avoid in my investigation of self-reliance is the tendency of scholars 




writing is his penchant for presenting both sides of an issue. He “want[s] merely to be tasted, not 
swallowed and comprehended” (Porte 6). Emerson is concerned with entertaining his readers; he 
“constructs each [essay] to invigorate rather than convince his audience” (Hughes xiii). His style 
does not appear to lend itself to drawing conclusions about his convictions, but a thorough 
investigation of his work over the course of his career reveals that recurring themes and ideas do 
exist in his writing. This notion of persisting beliefs forms the basis of my method for assessing 
self-reliance’s presence in Emerson’s early work and Society and Solitude. 
 Before examining whether or not self-reliance pervades Society and Solitude, I define the 
term in the first chapter of my thesis. As I previously mentioned, self-reliance refers to an 
individual’s ability to think his or her own thoughts. Though most scholars would 
unquestionably agree that this is a part of self-reliance’s definition, this description does not fully 
consider self-reliance’s numerous dimensions that ultimately inform our evaluation of its 
practicability, which is at the core of Whicher’s and others’ dismissal of its presence in 
Emerson’s later thought. As a result, my definition addresses self-reliance’s many components 
by merging scholars’ arguments about its democratic and religious nature. Essentially, I combine 
George Kateb’s conception that self-reliance is a form of democratic individuality with Randy L. 
Friedman’s and Whicher’s contentions that self-reliance involves an inner religiousness. While 
Kateb’s argument motivates most of my conclusions about self-reliance, the incorporation of 
Friedman’s and Whicher’s views about self-reliance’s spiritual quality allows me to distinguish 
Kateb’s definition from my own.   
 After I propose my own definition of self-reliance, the remainder of my thesis works 
closely with the essays in Society and Solitude and utilizes comparisons between these texts and 




chapter, I focus on self-reliance’s permeation of the most concrete subject matter in Society and 
Solitude. The chapter’s first section investigates the relationship between labor and democratic 
individuality in “Civilization” and “Farming.” More specifically, I show how labor is a 
fulfillment of democratic individuality and not, as Christopher Newfield suggests, a 
“submission” to corporate individualism by pointing to moments when Emerson alludes to the 
Universal Mind, another dimension of self-reliance (5). The second section explores self-trust in 
innovation and historical reading in “Works and Days” and “Books.” This part includes an 
elucidation of Emerson’s thoughts about conformity and counters Sacvan Bercovitch’s belief 
that Emerson’s later work illuminates his struggle with social change. Throughout this chapter, I 
stress that these essays’ material topics do not signal a departure from self-reliance and instead 
show that self-reliance is a practicable idea. 
 Subsequently, the final chapter examines Emerson’s infusion of self-reliance into Society 
and Solitude through abstractions. The inspiration for this chapter stems from John Carlos 
Rowe’s assertion that Emerson’s later works are devoid of his youth’s “idealistic,” or abstract, 
“rhetoric” (24). In the chapter’s first section, I scrutinize abstraction in “Courage” and “Success,” 
two intangible traits that Emerson connects to self-trust, and the second section illustrates how 
abstraction reveals the presence of democratic individuality in “Clubs” and religiousness in 
“Art.” By demonstrating that these essays are filled with abstractions, I establish that Emerson 
has not renounced his “idealistic rhetoric,” which includes self-reliance. 
 This examination of self-reliance’s presence in Society and Solitude shows that 
Emerson’s later work does not abandon this idea, the most significant principle in his early 
philosophy. The thesis’s conclusion contends that Emerson’s unwavering belief in self-reliance 




War’s dimming effect on American thinkers and Emerson in particular. Furthermore, this part 
confirms that Emerson’s consistent promotion of self-reliance during his youth cannot be 
considered “foolish” because he never deserted the idea (Emerson, S-R 24). Thus, my argument 
resurrects the legacy of Emerson’s early work by illustrating that he still clung to his idea of self-









 There is perhaps no greater affirmation of Emerson’s most famous idea than near the 
beginning of his essay “Self-Reliance” when he asserts, “To believe your own thought, to believe 
that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men—that is genius” (S-R 19). This is 
self-reliance at its core: a steadfast trust in one’s own thoughts that effects a certain universality, 
a connection to the rest of humanity.
1
 The first part of this definition—self-trust in one’s own 
“thought[s]”—is the least controversial aspect of self-reliance because it is generally included in 
every scholar’s portrayal of the concept. For example, George Kateb describes self-trust as 
follows; “[I]t is the steady effort of thinking one’s thoughts and thinking them through” (31). 
However, as Kateb acknowledges, defining self-reliance as merely self-trust is reductive; there 
are other dimensions of self-reliance, such as its ability to unite humanity through the Universal 
Mind, that allow us to evaluate its practicability and, consequently, to possess a more nuanced 
understanding of its complexity. For this argument’s purposes, practicability refers to an idea’s 
compatibility with societal norms. It is essential to assess self-reliance’s practicability because 
many scholars treat Emerson’s focus on more concrete subjects in his later work as a sign that he 
abandoned self-reliance (Bercovitch 342; Bloom 62; Rowe 1; Whicher 52).  Self-reliance’s 
practicability primarily hinges on two questions: Is it possible for a self-reliant individual to 
participate in society, and can a self-reliant person remain an independent thinker while 
observing a religion? Scholars have debated these issues because Emerson’s ideal requires 
“nonconformity” (Emerson, S-R 24). His use of nonconformity is unconventional because it is 
not particularly concerned with an individual’s arrival at a completely original end; instead, 
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Emerson focuses on the “method of intellect” that one employs to reach a certain opinion or 
action (Kateb 3). If people utilize thought processes that are inherently unique to them, they are 
not conforming to the masses even if their conclusions mirror those of other individuals.   
 Emerson alludes to this notion in his essay “History” (1841) when he discusses the 
aforementioned “Universal Mind” (Essays 2). He declares that “[t]here is one mind common to 
all individual men” (1). In other words, there is one “common” characteristic of all “individual,” 
or nonconformist, people, which is that they submit to their own modes of thinking. Basically, 
the “Mind” represents the method of thinking that Kateb regards as the key to Emerson’s 
thought; “each individual man is one more incarnation” of the Universal Mind, and these 
additions are recorded by history (Emerson, Essays 2). Emerson offers the example of a 
revolution to further illustrate this concept, saying, “Every revolution was first a thought in one 
man’s mind, and when the same thought occurs to another man, it is the key to that era” (2). At 
its outset, a revolution is nonconformist in nature because it involves a revolt against certain 
societal norms, and its leader is certainly nonconformist since his or her ideas provide the 
impetus for this insurrection. Yet, by most definitions of nonconformity, the leader’s followers 
are conformists, adopting a mass viewpoint.  This passage demonstrates where Emerson differs 
in his characterization of nonconformity because he depicts two men individually arriving at the 
same “thought.” In this hypothetical revolution, there is no distinction between leaders and 
followers; there is merely the chronological order in which they have attained a shared belief, or 
to put it in Emersonian terms, in which they have submitted to the Universal Mind. Despite 
reaching the same conclusion, both men have practiced self-reliant thinking by adhering to the 




 While the Universal Mind supports my contention that Emerson’s conception of 
nonconformity is practicable because the Mind explains how independent thinking can plausibly 
lead to conformist behavior, most contemporary Emersonian academics have echoed Stephen E. 
Whicher’s prominent position that “Emerson’s whole dream of practical power through Self-
reliance is just that—a dream” (Whicher 69).
2
 John Carlos Rowe classifies Emerson as the leader 
of this “`aesthetic dissent,’” a form of romantic idealism that is “naive” and overlooks “social 
convention” (1). On the other hand, there are some scholars, such as Kateb and Randy L. 
Friedman, who disagree with the claims of Whicher’s followers and propose their own ideas 
about self-reliance. As a result, before examining whether Emerson’s self-reliance pervades 
Society and Solitude, I need to define this controversial term so that I can adequately evaluate its 
presence in Emerson’s final major work. 
 Social participation and religiousness lie at the core of my assessment because they are 
both frequently cited as reasons that self-reliance is impracticable (Gelpi 149; Whicher 64). 
Social participation involves an individual’s voluntary contribution to a group of people by 
supporting certain causes and norms that benefit the collective whole. Similarly, religiousness 
generally entails an association with a group of people that share common creeds and submit to 
divine authority. In essence, both social participation and religiousness appear to clash with 
nonconformity by requiring acceptance of others’ beliefs. Conversely, the Universal Mind, 
which I have just briefly explored, helps us understand how each is not conformist. In this 
chapter, by extensively investigating the Universal Mind and combining Kateb’s characterization 
of self-reliance as a form of “democratic individuality” with Friedman’s assertion that the idea 
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implies an “inner” spirituality, I illustrate that self-reliance is compatible with both social 
participation and religiousness (Kateb 1; Friedman 165).   
I. Democratic Individuality and the Universal Mind’s Forces 
  For a man who took such pleasure in examining nature, Emerson spent a considerable 
amount of his life writing about society and its norms. More specifically, he developed a 
philosophy that evaluated individuals’ psychological motivations for participating in society. In 
his view, an individual’s involvement in society stems from an adherence to the Universal Mind, 
a representation of independent thinking that possesses two forces. The first is a sense of 
character, which he describes as “a reserved force [acting] directly by presence and without 
means” (Essays 242). All people possess this quality, but only a few actually realize it. These 
individuals “do not need society [and] can entertain themselves very well alone,” but this sense 
of contentment does not prevent them from ultimately entering a community (242). Instead, 
character is, in itself, an ascertainment of some higher truth that leads these individuals to seek 
justice in society.  Emerson explains the relationship between truth and justice as follows: “Truth 
is the summit of being; justice is the application of it to affairs. All individual natures stand in a 
scale, according to the purity of this element in them. The will of the pure runs down from them 
into other natures, as water runs down from a higher into a lower vessel” (245). Essentially, 
individuals who possess character contribute to society by spreading their inherent righteousness 
to others in various “affairs” (245). It is only through this distribution of morality that a sense of 
justice and order can truly be achieved, so people with character will always choose to join 
society even though they can subsist outside of this realm. 
 Democratic societies are labeled as such because of their egalitarianism and 




intrinsic morality of democracy that Emerson alludes to with his concept of character. In Kateb’s 
estimation, democracy is the “only moral political system” because it “pays homage to the idea 
that all human beings, just by the fact that they are human beings, are morally equal” (181). This 
argument posits that all people are born with an equal opportunity to think and act morally when 
living in a democratic society. Not everyone will fully realize or exercise this moral fiber within 
them, but those who do will often feel compelled to contribute to the collective whole.   
 A similar notion underlies self-reliance. In an ideal democratic environment, people are 
afforded an equal opportunity to think and work independently, and individuals who practice 
self-reliance comprehend that their combined efforts ultimately result in collective improvement. 
David M. Robinson calls this phenomenon the “moral sense or moral sentiment,” a quality that is 
“measured not by its contribution to the individual but by the individual’s contribution to the 
larger whole that transcend[s] the particular self” (21). Even if he never explicitly links morality 
to self-reliance, Emerson implies that the idea encompasses integrity because he depicts self-
reliance in an analogous fashion to character. When Emerson discusses the nature of valiant 
behavior in “Heroism” (1841), he asserts, “Heroism is an obedience to a secret impulse of an 
individual’s character...[and] [s]elf-trust is the essence of heroism” (Essays 132). Equating self-
reliance, or “self-trust,” to a “secret impulse” is quite similar to when Emerson portrays character 
as “a certain undemonstrable force, a familiar or genius, by whose impulses the man is guided 
but whose counsels he cannot impart” (242). It is critical to notice that people take a passive role 
in Emerson’s descriptions of self-reliance and character; in both cases, an inner “force” or 
“impulse” affects the individual’s thoughts and actions, but the person is unaware of this 




Mind, a representation of independent thinking that explains how self-reliance is congruous with 
social participation.   
 Whicher’s argument entirely ignores the democratic aspect of self-reliance. He claims 
that Emerson’s “wish for independence clashed also with his sense of obligation to be useful to 
the society he repudiated” (64). This contention errs because it presupposes that an individual 
cannot independently arrive at the idea that social participation is important. Emerson does not 
reject the notion of “be[ing] useful,” or contributing, to a society. He only bemoans this behavior 
when an individual’s participation is solely motivated by others’ thinking and actions. As I have 
previously expressed, Emerson deems that self-reliant individuals often autonomously arrive at 
the conclusion that their independently motivated actions can “add” to communities, so 
Whicher’s implication that social responsibility detracts from self-reliance is invalid (Emerson, 
Essays 65).   
 The weakness of Whicher’s position primarily stems from a couple of false assumptions, 
both of which are evident when he declares that Emerson’s “rebellion against the dominion of 
society encountered two main obstacles: his fear of solitude, and his sense of responsibility” 
(62). Whicher’s belief that Emerson had a “fear of solitude,” an idea that he bases on Emerson’s 
unease following his resignation from the Unitarian ministry in 1832, is flawed in two respects 
(62). First, he conflates Emerson’s life experiences with his philosophy. Emerson was constantly 
“depending on others and concerned with what they thought of him,” but this personal anxiety 
about his public perception does not necessarily apply to his concept of a self-reliant individual 
(Sacks 3). In other words, Emerson’s inability to live outside of society does not signify that all 
individuals possess the same incapacity; it is highly unlikely that Emerson would completely 




Whicher treats Emerson’s employment of solitude far too literally. When Emerson uses this 
term, he refers to the inner serenity of a self-reliant individual’s mind, not social isolation. 
Emerson emphasizes that solitude is ideally found within the confines and structure of society, 
affirming that “the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness 
the independence of solitude” (S-R 23). If we consider “crowd” to be an allusion to public life, 
Emerson’s idea of a self-reliant person is not an aloof individual who lives alone in the woods; 
rather, it is an individual who remains true to his or her inner convictions while “add[ing] to the 
world” (Essays 65). Emerson describes this contribution to society as “virtuous,” further 
indicating that democratic conduct is ideal and part of self-reliance (65). 
 I have demonstrated that self-reliance is compatible with social participation, but the 
precise nature of self-reliant individuals’ role in society has, up until now, not been explored. To 
investigate this matter, we must first comprehend Kateb’s distinction between two types of self-
reliance: “mental” and “active” (xlii). Mental self-reliance is “the steady effort of thinking one’s 
thoughts and thinking them through,” and active self-reliance is “independent activity” (31; 135). 
Active self-reliance always requires mental self-reliance because all activity is “incomplete or 
inadequate unless one makes the effort to disclose it and make it signify, and such an effort of 
contemplation and interpretation is of course a mental one” (29); a person always considers, even 
if it is just for an instant, the motivations and implications of their behavior before and after a 
particular action. The “independent” quality that Kateb ascribes to active self-reliance therefore 
stems from the autonomous thinking, or mental self-reliance, that individuals used to 
contextualize such actions (135).   
 Through their own methods of thinking, self-reliant individuals can fulfill the “highest 




the core of a person’s existence; “[o]ne’s active vocation is the expression and completion of 
one’s being, but it is also the reason for being” (Kateb 24). Emerson says that “[e]ach man has 
his own vocation...[that is] silently inviting him...to endless exertion” (Essays 74). In this 
statement, Emerson employs “silently” to stress that vocation is not motivated by external 
influences; people must grasp this force on their own. Since Emerson portrays this calling as an 
internal force that affects an individual’s thoughts and actions, we can treat vocation as the 
second element of the Universal Mind. Vocation mirrors character, the Mind’s other force, in the 
sense that one must contribute to society in order to fully realize the concept. As Emerson notes, 
“Until [a man] can manage to communicate himself to others in his full stature and proportion, 
he does not yet find his vocation” (Essays 75). Consequently, the parallels between character and 
vocation suggest that vocation also functions as a dimension of self-reliance and helps to explain 
self-reliance’s democratic nature. Basically, for democratic societies to improve, they need 
people with a variety of different skills to voluntarily coalesce. Self-reliant individuals’ vocations 
reveal their “unique” talents, so the collaboration amongst people with different vocations allows 
a society to reach its full democratic potential (Kateb 167). 
 Even though self-reliance can involve social contribution, Emerson does not try to claim 
that self-reliant individuals must aim to enrich society. Rather, he contends that society’s 
improvement will happen naturally if people think independently and carry out their own 
vocations, or “do [their] work” (S-R 23). Robert D. Richardson, Jr. addresses this notion, saying, 
“When a better society evolves, it will not, in Emerson’s view, come about through a suppression 
of the process of individuation but through a voluntary association of fulfilled individuals” (322). 
Essentially, a society improves when self-reliant individuals freely choose to enter its 




and cooperation do not conflict with self-reliance, “the self-reliant individual cannot be 
dependent on the contributions or service of others to such an extent as to be unable to 
reciprocate” (Kateb 145). This statement illustrates that self-reliant people must always retain a 
sense of self-trust and independence. After this examination of the Universal Mind’s two forces, 
character and vocation, it is evident that Emerson’s self-reliance involves democratic 
individuality, a mental and active manifestation of independence that promotes self-reliant 
individuals’ participation in society and thus demonstrates self-reliance’s practicability (Kateb 
17). 
II. Self-Reliance’s Religiousness: The Over-Soul as a Transcendental God   
 Before I assess the compatibility of religiousness and self-reliance, it is important to 
scrutinize Emerson’s stance on religion. While my investigation of self-reliance and Society and 
Solitude seeks to avoid conflating Emerson’s life experiences with his philosophy, his writing is 
“ravenously religious,” so his personal creed is relevant to our analysis in this section (Kateb 65). 
In 1832, Emerson left the Unitarian ministry, and he eventually rejected all forms of 
institutionalized religion. Emerson’s Divinity School Address (1838) articulated many of his 
reasons for renouncing the church. For instance, he urged his audience to stop following 
religious customs in order to achieve a true spiritual enlightenment: “Let me admonish you, first 
of all, to go alone; to refuse the good models, even those most sacred in the imagination of men, 
and dare to love God without mediator or veil” (S-R 114). This advice calls for people to practice 
their own religion without churches, clergymen, and biblical texts. He felt that Christian 
preaching bore little resemblance to its historical practice and that the Bible’s true messages had 
been lost over time. Emerson expresses this opinion after describing Jesus’s original ideas about 




the next, and the following ages!” (107). Despite Emerson’s criticism of the Christian church, it 
is crucial to note that he conveys a sense of devotion to God and Jesus, signaling that he still 
believed in traditional biblical figures at this point in his life. 
 Emerson’s allusions to God and Jesus in his work underscore a larger point, which is that 
Emerson never fully abandoned Unitarianism even though he left the pulpit. Unitarianism 
stresses the importance of Jesus’s “moral teachings” and the presence of one God, so Emerson’s 
references to these two figures and his emphasis on their virtuous nature in the Divinity School 
Address indicates that his Unitarian roots still had a discernible impact on his essays and lectures 
(Richardson, Jr. 47). Moreover, Emerson’s rejection of the church exemplifies Unitarianism’s 
resistance to institutional affiliation. In William Ellery Channing’s “Unitarian Christianity,” the 
famous Boston minister espouses this idea when he affirms, “Our earnest prayer to God is, that 
he will overturn, and overturn, and overturn the strong-holds of spiritual usurpation” (qtd. in 
Richardson, Jr. 47). For Emerson, the “distortion” of Jesus’s “doctrine and memory” is a form of 
“spiritual usurpation,” a gross abuse of Unitarian tenets (S-R 107; Richardson, Jr. 47). As a 
result, Emerson’s departure from the church can actually be viewed as a necessary action to 
uphold his Unitarianism.   
 While Emerson never relinquished some of his Unitarian beliefs, he certainly strayed 
from a biblical understanding of religion by establishing his own transcendental creed. In Nature 
(1836), Emerson frequently uses the outdoors as a medium through which the divine is 
ascertained. For example, he says, “In the woods, we return to reason and faith.  There I feel that 
nothing can befall me in life—no disgrace, no calamity, (leaving me by my eyes) which nature 
cannot repair” (8). Since Emerson’s employment of “return” suggests that we have deserted 




piety is forsaken. In nature, we can restore our piety because “[e]very natural fact is a symbol of 
some spiritual fact” (26). This tenet is not attributable to the Bible or Unitarianism; it is a 
transcendental principle, one that laid the foundation for a philosophical movement in the 19th 
century. In addition to his transcendentalism, Emerson extends the scope of his work to the 
experience of human existence. He says, “Man is conscious of a universal soul within or behind 
his individual life, wherein, as in a firmament, the natures of Justice, Truth, Love, Freedom, arise 
and shine. This universal soul, he calls Reason” (27). “Reason” is another term for the Universal 
Mind or the Over-Soul, a concept that pervades one prominent work in Essays.
3
 
 “The Over-Soul” (1841) is Emerson’s most authoritative advancement of his ideas about 
religion and elucidates how religiousness is compatible with self-reliance. In the five years that 
elapsed between the publication of Nature and Essays, Emerson maintained his steadfast belief 
in the notion of one soul that was inherent to all humans. In this essay, he refers to that spirit as 
the “Over-Soul,” an essence “within which every man’s particular being is contained and made 
one with all other” (Essays 141). By noting that this universal soul is found “within” every 
individual, Emerson indicates that people can identify this spirit without mediation. Though there 
are “other[s]” that submit to the Over-Soul, an individual can grasp this essence without 
conforming because the Over-Soul is an “inner source” of divinity (Essays 141; Friedman 165). 
A person’s acceptance of the Over-Soul involves an adherence to “divine impulse[s],” which 
lead him or her into the “region of all virtues” (Essays 141). At first, this process seems to 
conflict with self-reliance since the “divine impulse” appears to dictate the individual’s actions. 
However, as I stressed in my discussion of character and vocation, the decision to act on a force 
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 Emerson uses Reason, the Universal Mind, the Over-Soul, and the universal soul 
interchangeably throughout the course of his career. I adopt the scholarly consensus that these 




of the Universal Mind (or Over-Soul, in this case) can only result from a look inward, so a 
person’s recognition of the Over-Soul is therefore a product of self-reliant thinking.  
 Even if a belief in the Over-Soul arises from independent reflection, self-reliant 
individuals’ dependence on the Over-Soul could potentially signify “God-reliance” instead of 
self-reliance (Hughes 107). In order to investigate whether or not self-reliance is actually “God-
reliance,” it is first vital to determine if Emerson regards the Over-Soul as the God of his 
particular creed (107). There is an undeniable evocation of God in Emerson’s depictions of the 
Over-Soul, which he calls a “prophet,” “supreme,” “eternal,” “perfect,” and, most importantly, a 
“deity” (Essays 141). Conversely, Emerson mentions God throughout “The Over-Soul,” so some 
readers might contend that Emerson still regards the Unitarian God as his creed’s supreme being 
and that the Over-Soul is subordinate to God’s omnipotence. I disagree with this interpretation. 
In fact, the moments when Emerson invokes God’s name signal that God is contained in every 
individual; basically, the Over-Soul is God. For instance, Emerson declares, “Ineffable is the 
union of man and God in every act of the soul. The simplest person who in his integrity worships 
God, becomes God” (154). Unlike the Unitarian God, the Over-Soul is a collective being 
because it absorbs its believers, who “becom[e]” God. Clearly, Emerson considers the Over-Soul 
to be the God of his transcendental dogma.  
 The Over-Soul is Emerson’s God figure, so a reliance on this spirit technically qualifies 
as “God-reliance,” but not in the way that Gertrude Reif Hughes intends it (107). In Emerson’s 
depiction of the Over-Soul, each individual is a “part” of this God (Essays 141). Accordingly, a 
reliance on the Over-Soul is, at least partially, a reliance on oneself and the independent thinking 
that allows this God to be discerned. As Whicher asserts, “[T]he soul of man does not merely, as 




to realize one’s own divinity, an individual must break away from the “god of tradition” and the 
“god of rhetoric” who Christianity worships (Emerson, Essays 154). Emerson addresses this idea 
by mentioning that Jesus “speaks always from within” (151). Though Jesus has seemingly lost 
power in Emerson’s new view of religion, Emerson uses Jesus’s name as a rhetorical device to 
lend authority to his thoughts. Through his employment of the Over-Soul, Emerson establishes 
religion as a self-reliant ascertainment of the God within oneself.   
III. Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Emerson’s religiousness and Kateb’s concept of 
democratic individuality are compatible and form two critical dimensions of self-reliance. 
Democratic individuality stems from self-reliant individuals’ realizations of their character and 
vocations, the two forces that compose the Universal Mind. The Mind is also known as the Over-
Soul, the God of Emerson’s transcendental religion. Consequently, even if I have portrayed 
democratic individuality and religiousness as two different dimensions of self-reliance, they are 
certainly related elements because they both involve an intense level of introspection. Donald L. 
Gelpi illustrates this link when he says, “The decision to follow one’s creative genius despite any 
sacrifice or social intimidation disposes the soul to the creative influx of divine life. The moment 
of creativity reveals the divine. Creativity not only heightens self-awareness; it yields ultimate 
self-understanding” (44). If Gelpi’s idea of “creativity” is comparable to Emerson’s notion of 
vocation, it is apparent that this adherence to one’s inner calling “reveals” a sense of divinity that 
transcends the self. In other words, since practicing one’s vocation is part of democratic 
individuality, social participation can actually lead to religiousness. Ultimately, both democratic 
individuality and religiousness contribute to “self-awareness” and “self-understanding,” which 






SELF-RELIANCE IN THE CONCRETE 
 
 It is undeniable that Society and Solitude contains a more practical subject matter than 
Emerson’s early work. One only needs to glance at the titles of the book’s 12 essays, including 
“Works and Days,” “Books,” and “Farming,” to see that the collection primarily focuses on 
societal activities and institutions. Many critics have viewed this shift to material topics as a sign 
that Emerson abandoned self-reliance, which they deem an abstract and impracticable idea 
(Bercovitch 342; Bloom 62; Rowe 1; Whicher 52). The following examination of Society and 
Solitude’s most concrete essays dispels the notion that the societal content in Emerson’s later 
work signals a departure from self-reliance by highlighting the different dimensions of self-
reliance that these works reference. This chapter instead shows that these essays function as a 
means to further illustrate self-reliance’s compatibility with daily social life. The first section 
investigates Emerson’s thoughts about labor in “Civilization” and “Farming,” revealing his 
connection of the material—work—to the abstract—democratic individuality. Subsequently, the 
second section demonstrates a similar association by linking self-trust to innovation and 
historical reading, the topics of “Works and Days” and “Books.” 
I. “Civilization” and “Farming”: Labor as a Fulfillment of Democratic Individuality 
 Labor is at the heart of any culture. Even though they do not receive as much attention as 
political leaders or celebrities, assembly line workers, farmers, craftsmen, and other individuals 
with arduous occupations provide the foundation for any society. Emerson was quite aware of 
these laborers’ importance, and Society and Solitude frequently stresses their significance, 
particularly in “Civilization” and “Farming.” For Christopher Newfield, Emerson’s examination 




involves “individual submission” to a preexisting set of circumstances, or “system of forces” (5). 
On the surface, this notion might seem to support my contention that the Universal Mind’s forces 
guide a person’s participation in society, but the “forces” that Newfield refers to are external or, 
more specifically, economic. His argument primarily focuses on the distribution of power among 
the citizens of a capitalist society. By solely concentrating on the economic implications of 
Emerson’s later essays, Newfield overlooks a significant element of Emerson’s work: Emerson’s 
subtle emphasis on the Universal Mind amid precise reflections on society. Throughout 
“Civilization” and “Farming,” Emerson alludes to the Universal Mind’s forces, vocation and 
character, in order to illustrate that labor is a fulfillment of democratic individuality.   
 In both essays, Emerson’s references to vocation quickly emerge as integral parts of his 
discussions about labor in society. “Civilization” initially describes various societies’ 
progression throughout history before it promptly moves into an investigation of the reasons for 
their development. Emerson asserts that a common feature of a successful, growing society is a 
productive and content labor force who provides the community with a continuous supply of 
goods to meet its demands. He says, “The division of labor, the multiplication of the arts of 
peace, which is nothing but a large allowance to each man to choose his work according to his 
faculty, —to live by his better hand, —fills the State with useful and happy laborers” (SS 24). 
Through his employment of “faculty” (24), Emerson evokes his early depiction of vocation in 
“Spiritual Laws” (1841), which affirms that vocation is a “call” to one’s “faculties,” a “silent” 
summoning of a person to the “pinnacle” of his or her abilities (Essays 74). Essentially, people 
must realize and be able to choose and practice their individual vocations if civilization is to have 
“useful and happy laborers” (SS 24). Thus, in order for individuals to perform their vocations, a 




for people to “choose their work.” This “allowance” is nonexistent in nations where governments 
impose bans on certain occupations and force people to work in specific industries, so self-reliant 
individuals, who inherently only aspire to join societies that grant them the liberty to pursue their 
vocations, would not freely enter and improve such states. Emerson’s allusion to vocation in 
“Civilization” therefore serves as a means to illustrate that democracy, a political system that, at 
the very least, does not dictate citizens’ occupations, is superior to other forms of government 
because it appeals to self-reliant individuals and, as a result, produces an effective labor system. 
 While “Civilization” refers to laborers in a general sense, “Farming” specifically looks at 
those who till the land. The essay reads as an ode to farmers because of Emerson’s appreciation 
for these individuals’ contributions to various communities. For example, the work begins with 
the following description of the farmer’s importance to society: 
The glory of the farmer is that, in the division of labors, it is his part to create. All 
trade rests at last on his primitive activity. He stands close to nature; he obtains 
from the earth the bread and the meat... . The first farmer was the first man, and 
all historic nobility rests on possession and use of land. Men do not like hard 
work, but every man has an exceptional respect for tillage, and a feeling that this 
is the original calling of his race... . (113) 
From the outset of this passage, Emerson positions the farmer as a self-reliant individual. His 
assertion that the farmer “create[s]” echoes his characterization of self-reliant people as 
“creators” in “Self-Reliance” (SS 113; S-R 21). Moreover, in “Spiritual Laws,” Emerson declares 
that “vocation” is a type of “call,” so his portrayal of farming as the “original calling” in the 
above passage suggests that this occupation was humanity’s first vocation and that a farmer was 




understand how this “calling” is internal. When Emerson says that the “first farmer was the first 
man,” Emerson is referring to Adam, who God places “into the Garden of Eden to till it and to 
keep it” (SS 113; New Revised Standard Version Bible, Gen. 2.15). Even though God puts Adam 
in the Garden, he does not instruct Adam to till the earth; Adam intuits this duty on his own. Like 
Adam’s natural grasp of his role as a farmer, a self-reliant individual’s realization of his or her 
vocation requires a look inward. Consequently, vocation’s “call” is not dictated by external 
circumstances but by one’s own introspection (Essays 74). By associating farming with a 
prominent biblical figure, Emerson ascribes a divine quality to this form of labor and illustrates 
that it is a product of vocation and the Universal Mind. 
 Similar to his depiction of vocation, Emerson stresses that character, the second force of 
the Universal Mind, is an impetus for a successful labor force. “Civilization” addresses this idea 
when Emerson mentions that climate has a significant impact on a society’s progress. Despite the 
oppressive effects of frigid winters and arid summers on certain areas, Emerson claims that these 
places can overcome their environmental limitations and reach “high civility,” a term that 
Emerson frequently uses to describe a flourishing society, if their inhabitants possess “deep 
morality” (SS 26). Emerson’s employment of this word is somewhat unconventional. By 
“moral,” Emerson means the “respecting in action catholic or universal ends” (27). This 
definition mirrors my description of character as an internal force that compels self-reliant 
individuals to seek justice in society and spread their inherent righteousness to others. In other 
words, individuals who possess character qualify as “moral” because their voluntary 
participation in society is motivated by a “catholic or universal” aim, which is to better society 
through the distribution of morality to their peers. Labor results from character because the 




“secur[es] the greatest good of the greatest number” of people (33). By contributing to the labor 
force, self-reliant individuals exercise character and hence raise these societies to “high civility” 
(26). 
 For Emerson, farmers’ lives are tributes to character because they can easily toil solely 
for their own benefit, but they instead choose to provide services and set an example for “society 
at large” (116). Essentially, they are “continuous benefactor[s],” or constant implementers of 
character (116). As Emerson reflects in “Farming,” “This crust of soil which ages have refined 
he refines again for the feeding of a civil and instructed people” (125). Not only do farmers 
improve society by offering the fruit of their harvests, but they also present a model of self-
reliant behavior for others to emulate. More specifically, their dedication to their vocation—
tilling the land—has already resulted in the “moral and intellectual” improvement of “cities” 
throughout the world (116). Basically, Emerson believes that farmers have applied character in 
society by spreading their innate morality to those around them and have therefore advanced the 
development of numerous societies. It is certainly possible that some farmers may not realize and 
exercise this character within them. Conversely, Emerson feels that most farmers are able to 
recognize and apply this force because their distance from cities’ depravity leaves them with 
“uncorrupted behavior” and a “constitutional excellence” that is necessary to practice character 
and self-reliance in general (126). Through his endorsement of farming as an ideal occupation 
that influences the behavior of civilized areas, Emerson demonstrates that labor is not only an 
effect of character’s application to society but also a means to inspire moral behavior in other 
individuals. 
 By examining the references to vocation and character in “Civilization” and “Farming,” I 




comprehension of man’s “submission” to economic forces, as Newfield would suggest (5). On 
the contrary, Emerson depicts self-reliant individuals’ labor as a product of vocation and 
character, two critical aspects of democratic individuality and self-reliance. Moreover, the 
exuberant manner in which he discusses labor counters the idea that he has abandoned his 
conviction in humanity’s ability to practice democratic individuality. For instance, he proclaims 
in “Civilization” that man is “unbound, and full of joyful action. With this unswaddling he 
receives the absolute illumination we call Reason, and thereby true liberty” (SS 26). Once again, 
it is important to note that Emerson uses “Reason,” among other terms, interchangeably with the 
Universal Mind. Consequently, this statement indicates that Emerson still believes in self-reliant 
individuals’ ability to realize, or “receiv[e],” the Universal Mind’s forces within themselves. 
This “liberty” of the mind and spirit leads self-reliant people to fulfill democratic individuality, 
which manifests itself as labor in society. 
II. “Works and Days” and “Books”: Self-Trust in Innovation and Historical Reading 
 While the inextricable link between democratic individuality and labor is vital to our 
understanding of self-reliance’s presence in Society and Solitude’s most concrete essays, it could 
be argued that I have adopted a rather broad definition of self-reliance in order to cater to the 
book’s content. After all, Kateb’s notion of democratic individuality is a controversial 
interpretation of self-reliance, yet I heavily rely on it (1). In order to quash the critique that I have 
conveniently accepted democratic individuality as a means to justify the largely practical subject 
matter in Society and Solitude, this section highlights the prevalence of self-reliance’s most 
fundamental and indisputable element, self-trust, in the book (Kateb 19). This term refers to a 
certain conviction in one’s own thinking and actions. Emerson describes self-trust in “Self-




actual and in intellectual life” (S-R 21). This idea is common throughout Society and Solitude, 
but this section focuses on just two essays—“Works and Days” and “Books”—and the 
activities—innovating and reading history—that they scrutinize. In these essays, Emerson 
illustrates that these norms can lead to conformity in some individuals. By conformity, I mean 
the externally motivated acceptance or imitation of others’ views and behavior. It is the antithesis 
of self-trust; conformists ignore their own intuitions and solely seek the approval of others. 
However, Emerson also claims that a person can partake in these activities yet refrain from 
conforming. From his standpoint, if an individual’s own thinking is the inspiration for a certain 
end, then that end is not considered conformist. By demonstrating that Emerson merely rejects 
the conformity that results from innovating and reading history and not the activities themselves, 
this section shows that self-trust is compatible with these norms and that Emerson’s exploration 
of them encourages people to practice self-trust. 
 In “Works and Days,” Emerson investigates the impact of innovations on inventors, or 
“mechanic[s],” and adopters, or the collective “we”  (SS 129; 134). He opens the essay by 
expressing his amazement about technological advancements over the past century, but he 
quickly asserts that adopters can become too dependent on machinery and that they must 
continue to rely on their own minds. He says, “Many facts concur to show that we must look 
deeper for our salvation than to steam, photographs, balloons, or astronomy” (134). The 
significant differences in these four innovations suggest that Emerson regards innovation as a 
widespread, all-encompassing aspect of society. Furthermore, Emerson’s use of “salvation” 
underscores his belief that people possess a nearly religious devotion to inventions. This 
dependence on innovation concerns Emerson; the instant gratification that people receive from 




contemplating their “questionable properties” (134). The intellectually shallow employment of 
these inventions is the primary source of Emerson’s fear of innovation. People often accept and 
use innovations without first considering their actions or engaging in “deeper” thought (134). 
They ignore “gleams of a better light,” or the use of “reason as well as understanding” (Nature 
68). As a result, they become indistinguishable from the inventions themselves: “The weaver 
becomes a web, the machinist a machine” (SS 134). These conforming individuals increasingly 
replace moments of internal reflection, which Emerson views as a crucial part of practicing self-
trust, with hours of amusement that are dependent on various innovations’ functionality. For 
Emerson, self-trust “begins when a man cuts loose from dependence on any foreign force and 
lives wholly from within,” so there is a renunciation of self-trust when people habitually rely on 
inanimate objects or concepts—“foreign force[s]”—without first assessing the motivations for 
this reliance (Whicher 50).  
 Emerson believes that a similar desertion of self-trust is evident when examining 
inventors. Self-trust is the guiding force behind many inventions since they are often conceived 
in the mind of a single individual, but inventors frequently allow the process of innovation to 
govern their lives. As Emerson laments, “Works and days were offered us, and we took works” 
(SS 136). The notion here is that inventors should have many passions guiding their lives, not 
just a subservience to their own innovations; they should not solely live for the “works” but for 
the whole of the “da[y].” Moreover, inventors must be wary of their own successes: “[T]he 
machine is so perfect, the engineer is nobody” (135). If they create “perfect” machines, they 
make themselves obsolete. In other words, inventors must continue to innovate in order to 
preserve their roles, or identities, in society, but their inventions’ increasing flawlessness makes 




continue to flounder in their current one. In both situations, they lose their individual identities as 
innovators, countering the sense of independence that underpins self-trust. Additionally, some 
inventors are successful but still stray from self-trust because of the fame or money that results 
from their ingenuity. Emerson acknowledges that innovators frequently succumb to “material 
power” and become “lamed by [their] excellence” (136). Basically, they cease creating because 
they have achieved a degree of affluence that leads them to abandon their original method of 
thinking that inspired their innovations. By illustrating that adopters can become reliant on 
certain innovations and that inventors can lose their identities because of their own inventions, 
fame, or wealth, Emerson conveys that innovation erodes certain individuals’ self-trust.  
 For Sacvan Bercovitch and other descendents of Stephen E. Whicher, Emerson’s 
negative portrayal of innovation’s impact on self-trust in “Works and Days” is indicative of his 
later work’s increasing awareness of the powerful “agencies of change” in his society and self-
reliance’s clash with this “volatility” (Bercovitch 342). However, Bercovitch errs because he 
believes that “self-reliance [is] working against the ubiquitous conspiracies of society” in 
Emerson’s early work (313). In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that society figures quite 
prominently in self-reliance, a pillar of Emerson’s early thought. Because of his misconception, 
Bercovitch views Emerson’s attempt to mesh self-reliance and society in his later work as a 
departure from his original representation of the idea. Furthermore, he thinks that this supposed 
change stems from Emerson’s growing interest in “the theory and practice of socialism” and the 
“utopian dimensions not only of his own society but of modern liberal culture at large” (318; 
342). Bercovitch’s misinterpretation of Emerson’s early depiction of self-reliance renders his 
observations about Emerson’s “shift” in his later thought, including his belief that Emerson was 




 In addition to his inaccurate construal of Emerson’s early work, Bercovitch 
underestimates Emerson’s ability to show how self-reliance is compatible with various cultural 
developments. For an example, we can return to Emerson’s ideas about the relationship between 
innovation and self-trust. While people who create or rely too heavily on innovations can 
certainly lose the ability to trust their own thinking, adopters and inventors can still possess self-
trust. In order to survive in an increasingly innovative climate, Emerson contends that one must 
“remember the power of science” (SS 136). It is not a betrayal of self-trust to employ the 
“excellent” “mechanical aids we have applied to the human body, as in dentistry, in vaccination” 
(131). The adoption of certain innovations as remedies for illness are not acts of conformity if 
people possess their own individual reasons and motivations for using them. Moreover, the 
invention of such mechanisms are acts that exemplify self-trust and its “love” for “realities and 
creators” (S-R 21). As long as inventors remember to value their “days” instead of just their 
“works,” they will maintain a well-balanced life that allows them to sustain their identities as 
innovators (SS 136). Thus, innovation’s threat to self-trust as a vehicle of conformity is not 
grounded in its prevalence in society; it is instead based on the people that are adopting or 
creating the inventions. 
 In the same manner that he illuminates the potential pitfalls of innovation, Emerson 
cautions that historical reading can effect a reliance on past generations’ accomplishments and 
traditions, which leads us away from a sense of trust in our own thinking. “Books” most 
comprehensively addresses this idea, but Emerson first raises this notion in “Works and Days” 
when he says the following: “The reverence for the deeds of our ancestors is a treacherous 
sentiment. Their merit was not to reverence the old, but to honor the present moment” (144).  




in the present moment and suggests that the current generation should mirror their appreciation 
for the “present moment,” yet he criticizes others for “treacherous[ly]” reflecting on past 
generations. Nonetheless, the contradiction does not obscure Emerson’s belief that the present 
generation spends too much time celebrating past achievements and customs instead of moving 
forward and creating its own rituals. Emerson’s position in “Works and Days” clearly echoes his 
stance in the opening lines of Nature: “Our age is retrospective... . The foregoing generations 
beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes” (1). Once again, we see Emerson 
praising past generations’ ability to live with a certain immediacy and condemning his own 
generation’s tendency to be “retrospective.” Although Nature and Society and Solitude were 
published 34 years apart, these passages demonstrate that, in both books, Emerson holds the 
same feeling of disappointment about society’s tendency to become intellectually insecure. 
Instead of forming new traditions and challenging intellectual assumptions, Emerson’s culture 
often settled for conformity by merely revering the past. 
 While “Books” is predominantly a listing of Emerson’s favorite texts in various genres, 
the essay continues his rebuke of society’s admiration for past generations by strongly asserting 
that historical reading can lead to conformity and an abandonment of self-trust. For instance, 
Emerson maintains that America and Europe often use books about the “old pedantries of the 
world, [which are] our times, places, professions, customs, opinions, [and] histories” to 
determine current social practices (SS 171). This emphasis on conforming to the past leads 
individuals to stray from the “right reason” that guides their individual “duties” (172). In this 
context, “duties” refers to people’s roles in society. Instead of allowing their own thoughts—




their own behavior. As a result, people lose trust in their beliefs, culminating in a desertion of 
their “dreams” and leading to a society that is filled with conformists. 
 The fatalistic tone of this moment in the essay epitomizes Harold Bloom’s belief that 
Emerson “sacrifice[s] the joy of his authority” in his later work (55). Conversely, this notion fails 
to consider Emerson’s equally robust espousal of history’s beneficial impact on society when it 
is treated as a supplement to our own convictions and actions. Essentially, Emerson’s criticism of 
historical reading that results in a veneration for past generations is not a reproach of the custom 
itself. On the contrary, Emerson feels that an appreciation for our ancestors’ actions can enrich 
our thinking as long as people approach history with a skeptical eye that exemplifies self-trust. 
He explains that every student of history must read with “a pursuit of his native aim, instead of a 
desultory miscellany. Let him read what is proper to him” (SS 157). Emerson wants people to 
digest material that benefits them intellectually and is relevant to their individual existences; a 
thoughtless adherence to what society considers historically impressive does not benefit any 
individual. Emerson’s portrayal of historical reading as a mechanism through which individuals 
can learn more about their own lives is also seen in his essay, “History” (1841): “The student is 
to read history actively and not passively; to esteem his own life the text, and books the 
commentary” (Essays 3). The reader takes center stage in this depiction because history is solely 
meant to inform his or her own aims. In The American Scholar (1837), Emerson calls this 
method of reading “Man Thinking,” which is “comprised in self-trust” (“The American 
Scholar”). Thus, just as the creation and use of innovations can stem from self-trust if they are 
invented and adopted with individual scrutiny, society’s admiration for historical traditions and 
accomplishments can arise from original thinking if people independently consider past events’ 





 In this chapter, I have contended that Emerson’s numerous references to various 
dimensions of self-reliance during his investigations of labor, innovation, and historical reading 
in “Civilization,” “Farming,” “Works and Days,” and “Books” signify that self-reliance pervades 
even the most concrete subjects in Society and Solitude. In the first section of this chapter, I 
established that labor is a manifestation of democratic individuality, a crucial dimension of self-
reliance. More specifically, “Civilization” and “Farming” position labor as a fulfillment of the 
Universal Mind’s two forces, character and vocation. In the second section, I demonstrated that 
Emerson rejects the potential conformist effects of innovation and historical reading but also 
explains how these norms are congruous with self-trust in “Works and Days” and “Books.” 
Through this elucidation of self-reliance’s compatibility with social norms and activities, I have 
shown that the practical focus of Emerson’s later essays does not represent an abandonment of 
self-reliance. Furthermore, there is certainly not a shift in his writing “from the glorious 
potentialities of freedom to the chastening ties that bind” (Lydenberg 352). This chapter 
illustrates that Society and Solitude promotes a world in which people practice self-reliance 






SELF-RELIANCE THROUGH THE ABSTRACT 
 As one of the founders of transcendentalism, Emerson often allowed his writing to drift 
from the societal sphere and into the realm of the conceptual, particularly in his early works.  
Consequently, scholars often point to the lack of “abstraction” in Emerson’s later essays as a sign 
that he abandoned his early thought (Richardson, Jr. 4).
4
 John Carlos Rowe exemplifies this view 
when he says that Emerson’s later writing “tries valiantly to avoid the sort of idealistic rhetoric 
that characterizes his early and most often cited works, such as Nature, ‘Self-Reliance,’ and ‘The 
American Scholar’” (24). By “idealistic rhetoric,” Rowe means both Emerson’s early ideas, such 
as self-reliance, and his abstract presentation of them. Though Rowe’s stance is prevalent in 
Emersonian scholarship, his argument fails for two reasons. First, as I demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, Emerson’s cogitations about societal activities and norms in his later work did 
not signify his renunciation of self-reliance, a notion that epitomizes his youth’s idealism. 
Second, some parts of Society and Solitude, a work that I have treated as representative of his 
later writing, contain “idealistic rhetoric” that evoke his youth’s speeches and essays.   
 The presence of the idealistic Emerson in Society and Solitude serves as this chapter’s 
central focus. At times, his abstraction—a term that I employ to describe moments when 
Emerson explores the immaterial—is immediately apparent to readers. For example, this 
chapter’s first section investigates “Success” and “Courage,” two essays that exclusively 
examine intangible human traits—success and courage—and could quite easily be mistaken for 
works in Essays or Essays: Second Series from three decades earlier. The mere fact that Emerson 
discusses these attributes in Society and Solitude refutes Rowe’s claim that Emerson relinquished 
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his “idealistic rhetoric” as he grew older, but my analysis also points to specific abstract 
moments within these conceptual essays as a means to counter the entirety of Rowe’s contention 
(24). More specifically, I look at the relationship between these human traits and self-trust, 
which is the most fundamental dimension of self-reliance. However, there are other instances in 
Society and Solitude when Emerson’s abstraction is less obvious because of the concrete context 
in which it appears. This chapter’s second section analyzes a couple of essays, “Clubs” and 
“Art,” that talk about societal activities but also possess moments of abstraction that reveal 
Emerson’s allusions to democratic individuality and religiousness. In both sections, the 
illustration of abstraction’s presence and promotion of self-reliance in Society and Solitude 
counters the scholarly consensus that Emerson deserted self-reliance, the pillar of his early 
work’s idealism. 
I. Overt Abstraction: Self-Trust in “Courage” and “Success” 
 For Emerson, society has a tendency to mischaracterize human traits.  It exaggerates or 
misinterprets people’s actions, heaping praise on unworthy figures and forgetting commendable 
individuals. More importantly, people rarely challenge these widely embraced definitions of 
certain human qualities. In Society and Solitude, Emerson focuses specifically on two abstract 
attributes, courage and success, and their connection to self-trust. When they are properly 
defined, courage and success can embody self-trust. Conversely, the masses’ false impression of 
these two traits typifies the thoughtless conformity that is rampant in society. Throughout 
“Courage” and “Success,” Emerson demonstrates how people can misunderstand, properly 
accept, and ultimately view courage and success as forms of self-trust by repeatedly utilizing 




 In “Courage,” Emerson examines a trait that society frequently ascribes to some of 
history’s most prominent figures. He first illustrates that courage is often wrongly associated 
with military greatness, the “[a]nimal resistance” that people need to defeat violent foes (SS 205).  
He subsequently notes that courage is supposed to be a “rare” quality, yet “the instinct of the 
male animal when cornered...is no doubt common” (205). This statement’s abstract nature is 
undeniable because it involves a broad generalization about the “instinct[s]” of all “male 
animal[s].” Moreover, this sweeping assertion allows Emerson to depict society’s conception of 
courage as a trait that all individuals possess and can potentially act upon. To further convey this 
point, he lists a multitude of historical and mythological military figures, such as Hercules and 
Napoleon Bonaparte. It could be argued that this list does not establish valor’s pervasiveness 
because the seventeen individuals who Emerson names hail from eras that span numerous 
centuries, but Emerson demonstrates that courage applies to more than just these figures by 
elaborating on society’s idea of “animal resistance” in the same section of the essay. He says that 
society ascribes courage to “any man who puts his life in peril in a cause which is esteemed” 
(205). If we treat “cause” as a reference to war, a subject that is clearly the focus of this section 
of “Courage,” we see that society’s definition of courage could be applied to millions of 
individuals; it is no longer a “rare” attribute. Through an abstract affirmation about animals’ 
instincts, Emerson shows that courage’s connection to military involvement has diminished the 
word’s meaning. Consequently, the popular exaltation of military figures signals a thoughtless 
embracement of this notion of valor.  
 Although he believes that many people misunderstand courage, Emerson suggests that 
individuals’ acceptance of the attribute’s traditional definition can exemplify mental self-




another abstract moment that expands the scope of his investigation of courage, Emerson 
compares a person’s ability to independently define courage to an individual’s capacity to 
withhold judgment on a highly criticized book, saying, “In all applications [it] is the same power, 
—the habit of reference to one’s own mind, as the home of all truth and counsel” (SS 215). 
Emerson’s employment of “counsel” signifies that people should use their own “mind[s]” to 
guide their opinions. Basically, people must practice, or “appl[y],” mental self-reliance in order 
to fully express the “truth.” Furthermore, the statement’s diction—“all,” “power,” and “truth”—
conjures a sense of universality and profundity that characterizes Emerson’s early abstraction 
(215), the kind of “idealistic rhetoric” that Rowe claims Emerson’s later work lacks and makes it 
“impossible [for Emerson] to deal with the world of actualities” (Rowe 24; Lydenberg 356). As 
we see here, Emerson does ground his idealism in reality. He provides a plausible example of 
how mental self-reliance, an “idealistic” construct, can influence individuals’ perception of 
books (Rowe 24). It is certainly not “impossible” to fathom an individual who refrains from 
critiquing a book before reading it, just as it is not “impossible” to imagine a person who 
develops his or her own definition of courage (Lydenberg 356). By tying these two situations 
together through an abstract assertion of mental self-reliance, Emerson suggests that the 
traditional understanding of courage is only inadequate if it is accepted without independent 
thinking.  
 Emerson certainly encourages people to arrive at their own conclusions about self-
reliance, but he also believes that self-trust is indisputably a form of courage. To demonstrate 
this concept, Emerson once again turns to war imagery in a distinctly abstract depiction of 
courage: “[T]he pure article [of courage], courage with eyes, courage with conduct, self-




endowment of elevated characters” (SS 205). Emerson’s use of “self-possession” certainly 
evokes the notion of self-trust, but it is the words preceding “self-possession” that truly illustrate 
this idea. In an Emersonian context, the word “pure” generally refers to the natural essence of 
someone or something, and self-trust is inherent to people. Self-trust also involves observation of 
the surrounding world—“eyes”—and independent “conduct.” This diction indicates that 
Emerson’s characterization of courage is indistinguishable from a description of self-trust. 
Additionally, the personification of the “cannon” and the employment of “elevated” give this 
passage a valiant and dramatic tone that illuminates Emerson’s intangible aim, which is to stress 
the sense of heroism in practicing self-trust. As Emerson proclaims in “Heroism” (1841), “Self-
trust is the essence of heroism” (Essays 132). If we treat heroism as synonymous with courage, it 
is clear that Emerson views self-trust as inextricably linked to valor. 
 Perhaps the most abstract expression of self-trust as a form of a courage arrives near the 
end of the essay when he says the following: 
Sacred courage indicates that a man loves an idea better than all things in the 
world; that he is aiming neither at pelf or comfort, but will venture all to put in act 
the invisible thought in his mind. He is everywhere a liberator, but of a freedom 
that is ideal; not seeking to have land or money or conveniences, but to have no 
other limitation than that which his own constitution imposes... . He wishes to 
break every yoke all over the world which hinders his brother from acting after 
his thought. (SS 219) 
Initially, we are unsure about the nature of the “idea” that “man loves” more than anything else 
in the “world,” but we learn at the end of this passage that “[h]e”—“man”—“wishes” to uphold 




purposefully ambiguous; it is a symbol for any “invisible thought[s]” that people possess. The 
significance of this opening is merely to establish self-trust as a necessity for “courage.” An 
individual must be willing to “venture all” in order to enact their own beliefs. A moment in 
“Self-Reliance” helps us understand how the “yoke” that “hinders” humanity from possessing 
self-trust is conformity. “Self-Reliance” asserts that the “world whips you with displeasure” for 
refusing to conform to the masses (S-R 24). In both “Courage” and “Self-Reliance,” a sense of 
punishment, either through the burden of the “yoke” or via the pain of the “whips,” awaits those 
who attempt to think and act independently (SS 219; S-R 24). Thus, the maintenance of self-trust 
is an act of courage.   
 This passage’s elucidation of self-trust’s relationship to courage exemplifies Emerson’s 
abstraction in Society and Solitude because he refers to intangible concepts such as “freedom” 
and “thought” rather than social norms and activities (SS 219). His accentuation of the 
individual’s liberty invalidates Stephen E. Whicher’s claim that Emerson realizes, beginning 
with his second-to-last major work, The Conduct of Life, that “freedom lies only in obedience” 
(168). Essentially, Emerson recognizes that his vision of courage and, accordingly, self-trust is 
both nonconformist and “ideal,” a classification that he also makes earlier in the essay (SS 219). 
Through his theoretical association of courage and self-trust and his own awareness of this 
connection’s “ideal” nature, Emerson illustrates that his work still heavily relies on his youth’s 
abstraction.  
 Emerson believes that success, like courage, is misunderstood by society, particularly in 
the United States. In “Success,” he contends that Americans increasingly view the attribute as 
exclusively a result of competition amongst each other, and he reflects that the American 




(230). Emerson’s employment of “coarse” conveys a disdain for this new American attitude, so 
this moment epitomizes Emerson’s critique “of the shallow materialism entailed by the 
conventional American idea of success” (230; Robinson 140). Emerson’s disapproval of 
America’s notion of success also appears in an abstract form when he discusses this false 
characterization’s roots. He says, “Cause and effect are a little tedious; how to leap to the result 
by short or by false means? We are not scrupulous. What we ask is victory, without regard to the 
cause” (SS 231).  Within this passage alone, there are three references to intangible concepts: 
“cause,” “effect,” and “victory.” Through these abstract terms, Emerson demonstrates that 
America’s idea of success is a product of a desire to achieve fame and glory without a proper 
“regard” for the process, or “cause,” that is necessary to achieve these ends. He feels that this 
outcome-focused view of success is a manifestation of “egotism” (231). While self-trust 
certainly involves a turn inward and therefore could be considered somewhat self-centered, it 
also benefits society by producing a culture that fosters unique perspectives. In contrast, egotism 
merely benefits one individual.  Emerson provides an example of this selfishness: “Men see the 
reward which the inventor enjoys, and they think, ‘How shall we win that?’” (231). There is no 
concern for the method of obtaining this “reward,” just a desire for the end itself. Similar to the 
way in which military figures become associated with courage simply because of people’s past 
misinterpretations of the word, competition and results become linked to success because of the 
thoughtless acceptance of a definition that neglects the process that is necessary to attain this 
attribute.  
 Once again, it is critical to note that, as with courage, Emerson does not oppose the 
adoption of the trait’s traditional definition even though he believes that it is inadequate. His 




arrive at conclusions about success. In Emerson’s model community—a group that is entirely 
composed of self-reliant individuals—people would define success in their own ways and resist 
the urge to unthinkingly embrace others’ views of the attribute. Yet, in reality, “it is rare to find a 
man who believes his own thought” (233-234). In other words, it is unusual to discover a person 
that practices self-trust because most people doubt their own opinions if they do not mirror their 
peers’ positions. This statement’s theoretical nature—it advances the notion that individuals tend 
to question their own “thought[s]”—further idealizes self-trust. While a self-trusting person 
could certainly arrive at the mass attitude that success is tied to “victory” (231), Emerson 
abstractly asserts that the embellishment of personal achievement—an effect of his peers’ 
mischaracterization of success—directly counters self-trust: “He only who comes into this 
central intelligence, in which no egotism or exaggeration can be, comes into self-possession” 
(236). As previously noted, “self-possession” is an abstract reference to self-trust, and the use of 
“central intelligence” alludes to the Universal Mind, an immaterial dimension of self-reliance. 
This intangible terminology supports the idea that individuals cannot embody the Universal 
Mind unless they have a steadfast dedication to the “Truth” (Nature 27).  Since self-trusting 
individuals belong to the Universal Mind, it follows that these people cannot possibly hold a 
view of success that is based on a hyperbolic inflation of one’s own accomplishments. Thus, 
even though a proper devotion to independent thinking could still result in an acceptance of 
courage’s traditional definition and exemplify self-trust, Emerson abstractly contends that a 
person who possesses self-trust would never freely choose this characterization of the term.  
 Emerson emphasizes that people can define success in a variety of ways as long as they 
practice self-trust, but he also maintains that self-trust is itself a form of success. This declaration 




Self-trust is the first secret of success... . It by no means consists in rushing 
prematurely to a showy feat that shall catch the eye and satisfy spectators. It is 
enough if you work in the right direction. So far from the performance being the 
real success, it is clear that the success was much earlier than that, namely, when 
all the feats that make our civility were the thoughts of good heads... . It is the 
dulness [sic] of the multitude that they cannot see the house, in the ground-plan; 
the working, in the model of the projector. (SS 234-235) 
Emerson’s use of “of” instead of “to” in his affirmation that self-trust “is the first secret of 
success” is significant because “of” implies that self-trust is a part of success rather than a 
characteristic that leads “to” success. Emerson further clarifies this distinction by conveying self-
trust’s superiority in relation to society’s traditional conception of success. He says that self-trust 
“by no means consists in rushing prematurely to a showy feat,” which is a reference to the 
“shallow materialism” and outcome-focused, or “performance”-focused, nature of society’s 
notion of success (234; Robinson 140; SS 234). Essentially, self-trust values the process, or the 
“thoughts,” that ultimately result in certain accomplishments, not the “feats” themselves (234).   
 This idea is reminiscent of a moment in “The Poet” (1844) when Emerson calls “paths” 
and “methods” “ideal and eternal” (Essays 215). In the above passage, Emerson suggests through 
abstract analogies that the masses, or the “multitude,” do not appreciate that the process for 
attaining success is important (SS 235). He metaphorically illustrates that society is so intent on 
instant gratification that it cannot “see the house” or “the model of the projector” before they are 
actually physically built (235). More explicitly, society cannot comprehend the method or work 
that is necessary to assemble these structures. These metaphors involve physical structures, but 




theoretical idea that his culture does not value the method for achieving success. This example 
typifies Emerson’s complex representations of his beliefs throughout “Success” that enhance his 
readers’ understanding of his ideas about the trait; by abstractly depicting self-trust as a form of 
success that stresses the importance of independent thinking and action and hence challenges 
society’s impression of the trait, Emerson generates “a standard less prone to entanglement in the 
webs of social conformity” (Robinson 161). Consequently, although Emerson emphasizes that an 
adherence to self-trust can create diverse opinions about the nature of courage and success, he 
ultimately asserts that self-trust is itself a form of both traits, which is an abstract notion in its 
own right. 
II. Abstraction Amid the Concrete: Democratic Individuality and Religiousness in “Clubs” and 
“Art” 
 Unlike “Courage” and “Success,” “Clubs” and “Art” explore concrete subjects, so 
Emerson’s mere examination of these topics does not demonstrate a persistence of his youth’s 
abstraction. These essays’ practical nature is perhaps best conveyed by the precision of his 
advice for intellectual organizations’ meetings in “Clubs”: “[T]o a club met for conversation a 
supper is a good basis, as it disarms all parties, and puts pedantry and business to the door” (SS 
198). This specific counsel exemplifies Emerson’s predominantly pragmatic writing in both 
“Clubs” and “Art,” but there are other moments in these essays when Emerson allows his writing 
to drift into the intangible. In “Clubs,” Emerson’s abstraction arrives in his investigation of social 
relations and reveals his promotion of democratic individuality, a dimension of self-reliance that 
is primarily expressed by the essay’s frequent echoing of “Character” (1844) and “Friendship” 
(1841). In “Art,” Emerson’s abstraction emerges in his discussion of nature’s effect on human 




mirroring his portrayal of this spiritual essence in “The Over-Soul.” By drawing parallels 
between these essays and Emerson’s early thought, this section illustrates that Emerson still 
abstractly advances democratic individuality and religiousness, two dimensions of self-reliance. 
 For a large portion of “Clubs,” Emerson contemplates the nature of people’s 
conversations and social interactions, straying from his essay’s practical focus on intellectual 
associations and abstractly reiterating his ideas about democratic individuality that he had set 
forth decades earlier in “Friendship” and “Character.” For example, when Emerson talks about 
the nature of arguments between two independent thinkers, he reflects, “[T]here may easily be 
obstacles in the way of finding the pure article we are in search of; but when we find it, it is 
worth the pursuit, for besides its comfort as medicine and cordial, once in the right company, 
new and vast values do not fail to appear” (SS 188). Basically, Emerson believes that people 
should endure their quarrels with certain individuals because they can potentially discover the 
“pure article” by maintaining a relationship with their adversaries. The “pure article” is quite 
abstract; Emerson never explicitly defines this concept, so we are initially unclear about its 
meaning. However, his use of “pure” ascribes a moral significance to this passage and evokes 
Emerson’s early descriptions of character, a force of the Universal Mind that involves the 
internal ascertainment of a higher truth. Emerson’s employment of “search” and “pursuit” further 
supports the notion that he alludes to character in this passage. A crucial component of 
Emerson’s construct of character is that people who grasp this moral fiber within themselves will 
seek justice in society. For Emerson, justice is the “application” of character’s higher “truth,” a 
“purity” that resides within people, to affairs in a community (Essays 245). Thus, the “pure 
article” that the quarrelers seek to find in one another is character’s higher truth, an abstract idea 




 By depicting the discovery of someone else’s “pure article” as desirable to independent 
thinkers, Emerson fundamentally suggests that this detection of another person’s higher truth 
enriches one’s understanding of the world. More specifically, once the disputants in Emerson’s 
hypothetical argument realize that they can enhance each other’s knowledge and perspective on 
certain matters, they will begin to think about “new and vast values” that enrich their minds and 
influence their behavior (188). In the simplest sense, they will both be improved by their current 
and future encounters. This notion—a belief that the voluntary social participation of self-reliant 
individuals will ultimately result in collective improvement—is the essence of democratic 
individuality. The aforementioned passage’s emphasis on the beneficial nature of argumentation 
echoes a moment in “Character” that touches on the nature of friendship between two people 
who possess this moral strength: “I know nothing which life has to offer so satisfying as the 
profound good understanding which can subsist, after much exchange of good offices, between 
two virtuous men, each of whom is sure of himself and sure of his friend” (Essays 254). Like his 
reflection in “Clubs,” Emerson’s cogitation in “Character” highlights the enduring benefit of a 
proper relationship to another independent individual. The repetition of “sure” indicates that 
these “virtuous men” are confident in their own convictions and are therefore self-trusting 
people. Moreover, they discern this self-reliant quality in one another. The implication here is 
that, like the quarrelers in “Clubs,” these men have arrived at a “good understanding” after many 
disagreements; they have found “truth” in one another (245). By expressing the beneficial effect 
of self-reliant individuals’ search for higher truths in their peers through allusions to “Character,” 
Emerson abstractly illustrates in “Clubs” that a tolerance for disputes can ultimately result in two 




 Though Emerson asserts that a self-reliant person’s recognition of another individual’s 
character can improve his or her own thinking and behavior, this enhancement does not occur 
through a mere adoption of the other person’s beliefs; a thoughtless acceptance of another 
individual’s ideas is an act of conformity, the antithesis of self-reliance. For Emerson, peers’ 
enrichment of one another is instead a product of competition. By challenging one another to 
think deeply about certain subjects, self-reliant individuals expand each other’s mental 
capacities. Emerson addresses this notion in “Clubs” when he says the following about discourse 
in society: 
We consider those who are interested in thoughts, their own and other men’s, and 
who delight in comparing them, who think it the highest compliment they can pay 
a man, to deal with him as an intellect, to expose to him the grand and cheerful 
secrets perhaps never opened to their daily companions, to share with him the 
sphere of freedom and the simplicity of truth. (SS 193) 
Emerson’s diction demonstrates that this passage is an example of his youth’s abstraction; 
adjectives such as “highest” and “grand” connote a literal sense of enlargement that indicates his 
reflection’s vast scope, and his use of “freedom” and “truth,” two intangible concepts, 
illuminates his statement’s theoretical aim. A closer look at his language also reveals a greater 
understanding of his thoughts about listening. At first, this passage appears to advise listeners to 
accept speakers’ profound ideas, or “grand” “secrets,” but the inclusion of “expose” suggests that 
listeners possess the power to resist speakers’ views. Emerson could have utilized “teach” or 
“instill” instead of “expose,” but these words would have implied that listeners should merely 




 Through his employment of “expose,” Emerson ascribes a sense of independence to 
listeners that mirrors his belief about the appropriate relationship between two self-reliant 
individuals in a democratic society. Essentially, he feels that self-reliant people should always 
seek conversations that involve alternative viewpoints. As he asserts in “Friendship,” “[It is] 
[b]etter [to] be a nettle in the side of your friend than his echo. The condition which high 
friendship demands is ability to do without it” (Essays 111). In other words, self-reliant 
individuals should not aspire to have friends who willingly hold the same opinions as them. 
Instead, they should covet friendships in which both parties are willing to terminate, or “do 
without,” the relationship at any moment if they deem that it is necessary to retain their own 
convictions. Similar to his abstract promotion of listeners’ ability to hear but not necessarily 
embrace speakers’ ideas in the passage from “Clubs,” Emerson affirms in “Friendship” that self-
reliant people should pursue friendships but preserve their own views. 
 Due to self-reliant individuals’ constant desire to cling to their beliefs, friendships among 
these people necessitate “deal[ing] with” each other as “intellect[s]” (SS 193). Exactly how a 
person can treat another individual as an “intellect” is rather abstract and difficult for the reader 
to decipher, but this notion parallels another moment in “Friendship” when Emerson says that 
companionship “treats its object as a god, that it may deify both” (Essays 115). Basically, in 
order for a relationship between self-reliant individuals to be beneficial for both people, each 
individual must treat the other with high esteem, either as an “intellect” or a “god” (SS 193; 
Essays 115). If there is a lack of respect on either side of the relationship, there is at least one 
party that is no longer benefitting from the friendship; more importantly, the competition 
between them has ceased. Emerson references this idea earlier in “Clubs” by emphasizing that 




intellectual growth can only occur through competition, refuting Christopher Newfield’s 
contention that “[c]ompetition yields to kinship” in “Clubs”  (147). Simply put, Emerson claims 
that true kinship is competition because it results in collective improvement, the essence of 
democratic individuality. Throughout “Clubs,” Emerson promotes character and competition, 
two critical aspects of democratic individuality, through abstract diction that achieves the same 
intangible quality as his early depictions of the concepts in “Character” and “Friendship.” 
 In “Art,” Emerson’s abstraction arrives within an examination of the differences between 
the “Useful” and “Fine” arts (SS 39). More specifically, through constant allusions to the 
Universal Mind via his repeated use of the immaterial “Nature,” Emerson abstractly 
demonstrates that the creations of both art forms are spiritual endeavors and manifestations of 
self-reliant thinking (40). For Emerson, all art “aims at use or at beauty,” which is the basis for 
his distinction between the “Useful” and “Fine” arts (39). The useful arts include “agriculture, 
building, ...and the construction of all the grand and delicate tools and instruments by which man 
serves himself” (39). These arts are vital to society; without them, humanity would lack the 
apparatus for innovation and survival. Emerson appears to stress that the useful arts are 
subservient to natural forces, asserting that “the omnipotent agent is Nature; all human acts are 
satellites to her orb” (40). This idea is buoyed by Emerson’s later description of the climate’s 
effect on the useful arts, including “wind, sun, [and] rain” (40). However, Emerson’s use of 
“Nature” does not solely underscore the environment’s impact on the useful arts; his 
characterization of “Nature” as “omnipotent,” a word that people often associate with God, 
ascribes a sense of divinity to the term.   
 A reference to nature in the “Over-Soul” (1841) further illuminates the word’s spiritual 




heart; this, namely: that the Highest dwells with him; that the sources of nature are in his own 
mind” (Essays 155). In this passage, we can treat “Highest” as an allusion to the God-like 
essence—the Over-Soul or Universal Mind—that resides “with[in]” humanity because the word 
appears amid a larger examination of religion. The equation of “Highest” and the “sources of 
nature” in this passage not only reinforces the notion that “Nature” holds a religious meaning for 
Emerson, but it also indicates that “Nature” embodies the Universal Mind because it is 
“representative” of this spirit (155; SS 40). Accordingly, Emerson’s depiction of the relationship 
between the useful arts and “Nature”  in “Art” exemplifies his abstraction because he employs an 
intangible term—“Nature”—to refer to the Universal Mind and to show that the useful arts 
require a submission to this spiritual essence.  
 Emerson’s use of “Nature” as an allusion to the Universal Mind in his analysis of the 
useful arts signifies that his portrayal of nature’s influence on the fine arts also possesses a 
religious connotation. At the outset of his discussion of the fine arts, which are “[m]usic, 
[e]loquence, [p]oetry, [p]ainting, [s]culpture, [and] [a]rchitecture” (41), Emerson asserts that 
“[n]ature paints the best part of the picture; carves the best part of the statue; builds the best part 
of the house; and speaks the best part of the oration” (44). In the context of this essay, this 
statement might suggest that our understanding of the natural world influences our works of fine 
art because it informs our perception of “beauty” (39). Conversely, if we treat nature as a 
reference to the Universal Mind, the passage suggests that a proper adherence to the Mind assists 
in the production of fine art. Donald L. Gelpi advances this idea when he describes the link 
between creation and the Universal Mind as follows: “The moment of creativity reveals the 




can interpret this moment in “Art” as an abstract investigation of the relationship between people 
and this spiritual essence, the Universal Mind.  
 My characterization of nature has, up until now, ignored a primary assumption that my 
view necessitates. By asserting that “Nature” is representative of the Universal Mind and a 
guiding force of all artwork, I have implied that self-reliant individuals are the only artists 
because they are the sole members of the Universal Mind. In other words, only self-reliant 
people’s work can embody the Universal Mind because they are the only individuals who can 
intuit this spiritual essence. This stance might seem far-fetched, but Emerson affirms this 
position when he says, “The universal soul is the alone creator of the useful and the beautiful; 
therefore, to make anything useful or beautiful, the individual must be submitted to the universal 
mind” (SS 40). Basically, self-reliant individuals are the only people who can create artwork that 
is either “useful” or “beautiful.” Emerson’s declaration that one must be self-reliant in order to 
be an artist supports the idea that his use of the Universal Mind conveys the spiritual nature of 
self-reliant thinkers’ useful and fine artwork. Combined with his advancement of democratic 
individuality in “Clubs,” this reinforcement of self-reliance’s religious nature in “Art” through 
the intangible notion of nature illustrates that Emerson still abstractly promotes self-reliance’s 
dimensions in Society and Solitude. 
III. Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Society and Solitude contains numerous 
moments of abstraction that allude to various elements of self-reliance. More specifically, I 
established that Emerson’s abstraction in “Courage” and “Success” allows us to grasp his 
contention that these traits can exemplify self-trust if they are properly understood. 




religiousness in “Clubs” and “Art.” The purpose of highlighting the intangible in these essays 
stemmed from the scholarly consensus that Emerson’s later thought abandoned his youth’s 
“idealistic rhetoric,” a claim that refers to both the stylistic presentation and content of his early 
ideas (Rowe 24). As I have exposed throughout the chapter, this argument is invalid; there was 
never a “[p]ost-transcendental Emerson” because he still advances self-reliance, his youth’s most 
idealistic tenet, in Society and Solitude (Gelpi 151). Thus, the Emerson who we encounter in the 
book is not, as many scholars would suggest, a darkened, cynical shell of his younger self. 
Rather, he is a man who believes in the “beauty, truth, and goodness” that “spring eternal in the 
breast of man,” a hopeful individual who still clings to his faith in the mind’s transcendent 






 Over the course of this thesis, I have examined self-reliance’s presence in Society and 
Solitude, Emerson’s last major work, as a means to refute the scholarly consensus that Emerson 
renounced his early philosophy in his later work. Though Stephen E. Whicher is the forerunner 
for this particular strain of scholarship, Harold Bloom provides perhaps the best summation of 
this group’s assessment of Emerson’s career when he says that Emerson “finds you simmering, 
brings you to a boil, but does not stay to make coffee” (61). Essentially, Bloom metaphorically 
asserts that the young Emerson was able to grab readers’ attention and intrigue them with his 
espousal of idealistic concepts, but he abandoned his supporters by ultimately deserting his early 
ideas, or “not stay[ing] to make coffee.” Many scholars have adopted this stance because of two 
primary misunderstandings about the true nature of self-reliance. First, Sacvan Bercovitch and 
others speculate that Emerson did not account for societal norms and activities in his early 
thought and that, as a result, his later focus on practical topics signals a departure from his early 
work (342). On the contrary, and as the first chapter of my work establishes, self-reliance entails 
democratic individuality, an idea that not only accounts for self-reliant individuals’ social 
participation but also contends that these people seek to contribute to society (Kateb 1). The 
other misconception stems from scholars’ belief that Emerson’s later work does not contain his 
youth’s abstraction, or “idealistic rhetoric” (Rowe 24). In the final chapter of this thesis, I 
illustrate that abstraction is quite prevalent in Society and Solitude, so the notion that Emerson 
does not incorporate his early writing’s abstract content and style is also inaccurate. Thus, by 
showing that Whicher and his followers fail to properly define self-reliance, recognize its 




that Emerson’s later work does not abandon self-reliance and, consequently, does not completely 
deviate from his early thought. 
 This emphasis on the continuity between Emerson’s early and late depictions of self-
reliance resurrects his legacy because it underscores the compelling nature of his later work and 
indicates that he did not relinquish the concept. In other words, the scholarly consensus that 
Emerson deserted self-reliance implies that he realized the impracticability of the idea as he grew 
older, so these scholars regard his constant advancement of self-reliance in his early writings as a 
manifestation of the “foolish consistency” that Emerson labels the “hobgoblin of little minds” in 
“Self-Reliance” (S-R 24). This naive idealism is a major cause of his “present decline of 
reputation” (Whicher 36). Of course, this widespread view is erroneous because Emerson never 
deemed self-reliance impractical. My thesis therefore restores Emerson’s status as a preeminent 
thinker for some scholars by stressing that his life’s work represents an unwavering commitment 
to self-reliance. 
 Even more significantly, Emerson’s consistent portrayal of self-reliance revives his 
exalted reputation by demonstrating that he did not belong to the group of northern intellectuals 
who radically changed their philosophies during and after the Civil War. George M. Fredrickson 
is one of the many scholars who include Emerson in this group of thinkers because he believes 
that Emerson’s “emphasis on individualism and anarchism disappeared” during the war (177). 
He expresses this opinion in a more general assessment of Emerson’s post-war demeanor: 
Emerson thus seemed to accept the fact that many of his old ideals were ideals 
were without application in the new America foreshadowed by the war 
experience... . The new Emerson, like the Yankee lad he described in ‘Self-




who denied his individualistic, anti-institutional philosophy. The change in 
American thinking which occurred during the Civil War was perfectly summed 
up by the changing views of Emerson himself. (180)  
Fredrickson errs because he rarely cites Emerson’s writing from this period and thus relies on 
Emerson’s own life experiences, which do not dictate the content of his writing, to inform his 
claims. Emerson certainly became more involved in political and social affairs during this time, 
but his increasing activism did not necessarily impact his philosophy. Fredrickson also implies 
that Americans could no longer fathom Emerson’s idealistic beliefs in a post-war environment 
that was characterized by the omnipresence of death and suffering. However, the notion that 
Emerson’s mystical view of the world had no place in this society is purely speculative. Even if 
some post-war readers of the young Emerson felt that his writing was too optimistic, Society and 
Solitude illustrates that self-reliance, a bastion of the early Emerson, can manifest itself in the 
most practical elements of life. Furthermore, the mere espousal of self-reliance in Society and 
Solitude, which was published five years after the Civil War’s conclusion, demonstrates that 
Emerson did not desert his “individualistic” constructs. 
 While it could be argued that Society and Solitude is not an adequate representation of 
Emerson’s post-Civil War thinking because the essays were almost entirely written during his 
“creative burst in the 1850s,” Emerson still decided to publish the collection after the war had 
ended, so he likely believed that these works contained ideas that were still relevant to society 
(Robinson 150). If Emerson had truly felt that his early concepts “were without application” in 
this post-war environment, he would not have published them (Fredrickson 180). It is apparent 
that Fredrickson and other scholars include Emerson in the group of radically altered northern 




is a primary issue with Emersonian scholarship, and one that scholars need to avoid in the future 
if they want to accurately portray his career. A strict adherence to Emerson’s writing could 
possibly alter the scholarly consensus regarding his life and lead to more research about Society 
and Solitude and his other late works. This examination of the elderly Emerson could prove to be 
particularly fruitful for scholars; after all, “[i]n a world so charged and sparkling with power, a 
man does not live long and actively without costly additions of experience, which, though not 
spoken, are recorded in his mind. What to the youth is only a guess or a hope, is in the veteran a 
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